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Abstract
We propose that the formation of beliefs be treated as statistical hypothesis tests, and label
such beliefs inferential expectations. If a belief is overturned through the build-up of evidence, we
assume agents switch to the rational expectation. Thus, if the test size is unity, agents hold rational
expectations. We solve a Dornbusch-style model of exchange rates under rational expectations and
inferential expectations. Under the latter we prove that the regression tests of Uncovered Interest
Parity and the rational expectations version of the term structure display a downward bias. The
model also explains delayed overshooting and sharp changes in exchange rates.
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“While I was aware a lot of these [sub-prime] practices were going on, I had
no notion of how significant they had become until very late. I didn’t really
get it until very late in 2005 and 2006.”
Alan Greenspan CBS “60 minutes” 16 Sept. 2007
1 Introduction
Recent decades have seen a theoretical backing away from Rational Expecta-
tions (RE).1 Examples include: (1) near rationality (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985),
(2) agents as econometricians (Sargent, 1993), (3) parameter uncertainty and
econometric learning (Evans and Honkapohja, 2001), (4) model uncertainty
and robustness (Hansen and Sargent, 2001), (5) infrequent rational expecta-
tions, when inattentive agents consult experts (Carroll, 2003), (6) information
processing constraints and ‘rational inattention’ (Sims, 2003) and (7) utility-
based beliefs, or ‘optimal’ expectations (Brunnermeier and Parker, 2005).2
In this paper, we offer another alternative to RE, the insight for which is
captured in Alan Greenspan’s quote: evidence must build up to a ‘significant’
threshold before agents ‘get it’. This seems reasonable to us for three reasons.
First, asset prices sometimes move far more sharply than the underlying
fundamentals at the onset of a crisis, when beliefs are typically being revised.
Figure 1 shows evidence from three decades. In 1987, the ABC State of the
Economy Index declined gradually over the whole of the last quarter, yet the
Dow Jones did not collapse until October 19. In 1997, gradually declining
Korean bank share values heralded the need for substantial macroeconomic
adjustment (Burnside, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo, 2001), yet the currency held
up until the final quarter of that year (Radelet and Sachs, 2000). In 2007
delinquent sub-prime loans rose steadily over the whole of 2007, but sharp
falls in the Dow were not observed until early and mid-2008. Finally, steady
declines in base metal prices over 2008 preceded the sharp depreciation of the
Australian dollar by nearly half a year.
1RE has equivocal support in the experimental literature. While its predictions are not
rejected as null hypotheses in some contexts (see Dwyer, Williams, Battalio, and Mason,
1993), the most common outcome is that individuals do not hold RE (e.g., Schmalensee,
1976; Blomqvist, 1989; Beckman and Downs, 1997; Swenson, 1997). In addition, experi-
mental research often finds either under-utilization or over-utilization of priors (Camerer,
1995)
2Near rationality has been applied to the failure of UIP in Gruen and Menzies (1995) and
more recently in Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006). Econometric learning has been applied to
the failure of UIP in Chakrabortya and Evans (2006).
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Figure 1: Sudden Asset Price Movements in Three Decades of Crises
Notes: 1987 US: Dow Jones 600 Index and ABC News State of the Economy Index from
Datastream. 1997 Korea: USD Korean Won index (1 Aug 96 = 100) and Korean Bank
Institution Stock Price Index from Datastream. 2007 US: Dow Jones 600 Index from Datas-
tream and delinquency rates for sub-prime loans originated between Jan 04 and Aug 08
excluding home equity loans. Sub-prime loans are either identified as such by the servicer,
or have an original FICO score of less than 620; data from LPS Analytics. 2008 Australia:
Westpac Base metals sub-index and USD exchange rate from Datastream.
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Our explanation for the mismatch between the gradual erosion of funda-
mentals and the rapid asset price declines is that the fundamental factors are
noticed by agents as they form expectations. But, as described in the quote,
they take some time to ‘get it’ before dramatically downgrading their forecasts.
At that instant, asset prices decline sharply.
While the evidence from Figure 1 is clearly only anecdotal, RE has not
stood up well to more careful econometric scrutiny. Under the joint hypotheses
of RE, risk neutrality and zero transaction costs, the slope coefficients in a
regression test of Uncovered Interest Parity (UIP) and the RE version of the
term structure should both be unity. In the following regressions S, I−I∗ and
R represent the log nominal exchange rate, the short interest differential and
the long (here two period) interest rate. The errors u and v are both white
noise.
∆St+1 = β(It − I∗t ) + ut (1)
∆It+1
2
= γ(Rt − It) + vt (2)
Typically, the estimated coefficient in the UIP regression, (1), is less than
unity, and sometimes it is even negative (Frankel and Rose, 1995; Froot and
Thaler, 1990). Evidence based on (2) has not been as damning, but RE remains
a seriously contested hypothesis. For example in a study of 3-, 6- and 12-month
euro-rates for 17 countries, Gerlach and Smets (1997) found that the 76 per
cent of regression coefficients were less than unity (Figure 2).
The failure of UIP is particularly disturbing since it is a predictive failure.
Friedman (1953) argued that a theory may be valid even if the assumptions
are unrealistic, provided it predicts better than an alternative. The rational
representative agents of financial economics do indeed appear unrealistic,3 but
the predictive failure of UIP erodes the justification for RE as an ‘as if’ as-
sumption, at least in the foreign exchange market (although we do not deny
the fact that the problem may have other sources).4
3Bacchetta and Wincoop (2006) note that the extent of trading on the basis of interest
differentials is small relative to cross border wealth, that foreign exchange traders use a
variety of forecasting tools since they know that they are not likely to improve upon a random
walk (Meese and Rogoff, 1983; Cheung, Chinn, and Pascual, 2005), that agents trading
equities respond to information with a significant lag (Froot, O’Connell, and Seasholes,
2001), that mutual funds trade under restrictions of asset classes (Lyons, 2001) and that
many large investment companies fail to adjust their portfolios for long periods (Investment
Company Institute, 2002).
4A vast literature in the 1980s and 1990s routinely rejected UIP. Boudoukh, Richard-
son, and Whitelaw (2005, pg. 1) claim to have counted ‘well over a hundred papers’ that
document its failure, and say that this result ‘is one of the more robust puzzles in finan-
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Figure 2: Coefficients for RE Version of the Term Structure Tests
(Under RE Slope=1)
Source: Table 1 in Gerlach and Smets (1997)
Notes: The histogram pools together the slope coefficients of regression of the change in
short rates on the interest differential. The regressions have a different form from (2) for
3- 6- and 12-month securities, but under RE they should all be unity. Individually, the
sample means of the coefficients for each maturity are significantly lower than unity with a
maximum p-value of 0.03. The country list comprised European economies, plus Canada,
Japan and the US.
Our second reason is based on the experiment of Menzies and Zizzo (2005).
Undergraduates were shown the contents of two urns, each with different com-
binations of white and orange balls. One urn was then selected randomly, and
subjects received signals about its contents by the means of random ball draws
with replacement from the chosen urn. The prior probability of a particular
urn being chosen was 0.5 at the start of the experiment, but should then have
evolved under RE according to Bayes’ rule, as each new ball was drawn. In
cial economics.’ Although Chinn (2006) has shown that the failure is not as pronounced
for long-term securities, he also shows that the extent of the downward bias for short to
medium run securities is not disappearing with the passage of time. Burnside, Eichenbaum,
Kleshchelski, and Rebelo (2006) note that the literature has explored time varying risk
premia (perhaps as a result of endogenous market segmentation), the interaction of risk
premia and monetary policy (as in McCallum, 1994), statistical considerations such as peso
problems and non-cointegration of forward and spot rates, learning, biases in expectations,
and, the cost of actively managing foreign exchange portfolios. Unlike us, some of these
approaches assume RE, and blame the failure of UIP on auxiliary assumptions.
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fact, agents displayed belief conservatism. Even allowing for rounding, agents
failed to switch their probability guess far more often - over 30 per cent of the
time - than would be expected under RE. The evidence suggests that subjects
often noticed the evidence without changing their mind (further, less direct
experimental evidence for belief conservatism is discussed in the exchange rate
experiment by Menzies and Zizzo, 2007).
The third reason comes from the philosophy of science. While economists
have become uneasy with RE in recent decades, a parallel debate has been
carried on in the physical sciences on the status of hypothesis testing as a
model of belief formation. Mayo (1996) and Mayo and Spanos (2006) have
argued that there is a paradoxical reluctance of scientists to describe their
own belief changes in terms of hypothesis testing. The key point here is that,
if we, as social scientists, habitually use hypothesis testing to help form our
own beliefs,5 it would be natural to assume that our representative agents also
use hypothesis tests.
A hypothesis test is a good model for belief formation of the kind described
by Greenspan. In particular, until the rejection region is reached, agents no-
tice information without changing their minds. We call our model ‘inferential
expectations’ (IE) where ‘inferential’ refers to classical Neyman-Pearson infer-
ence.
We assume that, when a belief is overturned, agents switch to RE.6 Thus,
RE is a special case of IE if agents are unconcerned about mistakenly changing
their beliefs (the test size α equals unity). Seen in this way, α becomes a metric
for rationality: when it is zero agents are completely unresponsive to evidence,
and when it is unity they are completely untainted by belief conservatism. By
linking RE to IE in this way, we ground our expectations theory ultimately in
the structure of the model, which provides modeling discipline. Furthermore,
if this modelling practice is adopted consistently backwards through time, then
it follows that every null hypothesis was once an RE belief.7
We do not explore possible micro-foundations for IE in this paper, though
one could seek to justify IE by relative inattention, as implied for example in
5One author received criticism from a referee of a top-tier journal because significance
was accorded to a test in the submitted paper with a p-value of 0.052.
6An implication of this is that Bayesian methods and IE need not conflict: agents could
be infrequent Bayesians, with the time interval between updates determined by a hypothesis
test.
7That is, unless the initial null is arbitrarily chosen. In an empirical application of IE,
it would be possible to define the alternative hypothesis, or the null, in a way unrelated
to model-consistency. It could, for example, be made dependent on framing effects (e.g.,
Tversky and Kahneman, 1986). We leave this matter for future research, but note that it
would throw the treasured discipline of RE to the wind.
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Mankiw and Reis (2003). Scott and Nowak (2005) describe certain environ-
ments where hypothesis testing is an optimal way to learn. Bacchetta and
Wincoop (2006) show how infrequency of belief adjustment can be formally
related to the size of the adjustment cost. Another rationale for IE is that
it can be considered as a ‘fast and frugal heuristic’ (see Gigerenzer, Todd,
and The ABC Research Group, 1999) of bounded-rational belief formation,
characterized by information-gathering and information processing costs.
How fruitful can it be to make our representative agents use hypothesis
tests? We answer this question by building a Dornbusch style model for the
exchange rate, and then comparing its solution under IE and RE. Under IE,
our model generates downward bias for both (1) and (2), in keeping with the
empirical evidence.
Other anomalies in forex markets exist, such as the so called delayed over-
shooting puzzle. Unanticipated US monetary expansions are associated with
a persistent decline in US interest rates and an initial depreciation of the dol-
lar followed by an appreciation several months later (Eichenbaum and Evans,
1995). We show that our model can also replicate these anomalies.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents our model
of exchange rates. Section 3 connects our theory of inferential expectations to
related research and concludes.
2 Exchange Rate Determination and Term Struc-
ture of Interest Rates
We now append IE to a simplified ‘overshooting’ model (Dornbusch, 1976) in-
habited by identical same-α agents. This widely-studied and well-understood
framework is a classic application of RE, so it makes for an instructive com-
parison with IE.8
One noteworthy feature of Dornbusch’s model, which makes for an elegant
solution, is its stark version of RE. Agents have perfect foresight about the
future actions of the monetary authorities, and do not have to assign proba-
bilities to particular future contingencies.
8Difficulties in establishing the relationship between the real exchange rate and interest
differentials (Campbell and Clarida, 1987) and in forecasting nominal exchange rates (Meese
and Rogoff, 1983) count as evidence against this class of models. However, there is some
evidence that short-run volatility dominates the unfavourable empirics (e.g., Baxter, 1994;
Chinn and Meese, 1995). In the absence of a clear alternative, this class of models may be
useful when there are large changes in policy (such as the Volcker deflation).
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For the purposes of comparison, our treatment of IE will be stark too.
Agents choose between a belief that a monetary expansion is permanent, and
a belief that it will be reversed next period forever. Many other setups are of
course possible, but take us away from analytic solutions (see the appendix
for one example).
2.1 The Equations of an Overshooting Model
M − Pt = ByȲ −BiIt LM
Pt+1 − Pt = −Bp(Pt − E[P∞]) 0 < Bp < 1 prices




(It + E[It+1]) RE term structure
St − Pt = 0 for t = 0− and ∞ PPP
All parameters are positive and all variables are in logs, except the nominal
short and long (two-period) interest rate I and R. The exchange rate, money,
prices, output and foreign interest rates are S, M , P , Ȳ and I∗. P∞ is the log
of the domestic price in the infinite future. The log foreign price is normalized
to zero, so purchasing power parity (PPP) implies S = P . Time is indexed
t = 0, 1 · · ·∞, with time zero divided into an initial steady state 0− and a post
shock 0+. The expectations operator E[.] refers to either RE or IE at time t,
and all agents have the same expectation. The LM curve can be interpreted
as a quasi-Taylor rule, if it is re arranged with I as the subject and M as
the nominal income target. The price equation says that agents approach the
expected long run price level using a partial adjustment mechanism.
We define an initial steady state where Mt is zero for all t ≥ 0. In the
absence of any reason for prices to change, E[P∞] = P0− . The exchange rate
is stable in the steady state; therefore, UIP implies I0− = I
∗, money demand
implies P0− = −ByȲ +BiI∗, PPP implies S0− = P0− and the RE term structure
implies R0− = I
∗. The model is re-written in deviations from this initial steady
state, using lower case letters. To anticipate the next section, we allow money
to depart from its initial value (zero) by m.
m− pt = −Biit (3)
pt+1 − pt = −Bp(pt − E[p∞]) 0 < Bp < 1 (4)
7
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(it + E[it+1) (6)
st − pt = 0 for t = 0− and ∞ PPP
The assumption that expanded money does not lead directly to price pressures
(apart from its effects on expectations) is realistic if the length of a period is
relatively small in real time. One might expect this to be the case during a
currency crisis.
2.2 The RE Solution
We now consider the RE solution for a permanent money shock m at time 0+.
A new steady state occurs when t = ∞, where UIP implies I∞ = I∗, PPP
implies S∞ = P∞, the RE term structure implies R∞ = I∗ and money demand
implies P∞ = m − ByȲ + BiI∗. (Therefore in (4), p∞ = P∞ − P0− = m.)
The standard Dornbusch assumption of sticky prices is adopted (P0+ = P0−
so p0+ = P0+ − P0− = 0). RE implies perfect foresight so E[st+1] = st+1 ,
E[it+1] = it+1 and E[p∞] = p∞ = m. Making the latter substitution into (4)
we obtain a solution for prices.
from(4) pt+1 − pt = −Bp(pt −m)
⇒ pt+1 −m = (1−Bp)(pt −m)
pt −m = (p0+ −m)(1−Bp)t
= −m(1−Bp)t
The eigenvalue of the system is clearly (1 − Bp). To find i, we put it on the
left hand side of (3), and substitute the above solution for p.







Clearly, it+1 = (1−Bp)it. To obtain s, (5) is iterated forward to infinity (when
s = m) and the infinite geometric series, with ratio (1−Bp), is summed.
st = −(it + it+1 + it+2 · · · ) + s∞
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The full solution is given by equations (7)-(9).
it+1 = (1−Bp)it









2.3 The IE Solution
As a matter of definition, an IE solution needs two hypotheses, H0 and H1,
and a signal to help choose between them. IE employs the standard statistical
terminology in describing how the signal is processed. That is, a sampling
distribution of a test statistic is calculated under the null, where the test
statistic is some function of the signal. The test size α then implies a rejection
region.
With regard to the hypotheses, H0 is the belief that next period (t + 1) the
central bank will undo the expansion that has been in operation from 0+ to t,
in such a way that the exchange rate will revert to the pre-shock value forever.
This requires that all future interest differentials (but not the current one) are
zero (to fulfil (5) iterated one period forward). Thus we have the following
hypotheses.
• H0: The monetary expansion is not permanent ⇒ st+j = it+j = 0, j > 09
• H1: The monetary expansion is permanent; mt+j = m, j ≥ 0
The null hypothesis is equivalent to believing that the central bank is
engaging in a managed float, and that the initial steady-state exchange rate
(S0) is its target level of the currency.
10 The switch between H0 and H1
describes a situation where forex traders suddenly discard their belief that a
currency target will be attained from next period onwards, when the credibility
9The two hypotheses do not exhaust all possibilities, such as the central bank undoing
the shock in, say, t+3. The text develops the simplest possible stochastic environment that
will illustrate the impact of IE on this model.
10This target can only be met by setting the appropriate level of interest rates, and
departures from the target are possible. Therefore, the institutional setup of the model is
a managed float (rather than a fixed rate regime) where the instrument is the interest rate
(rather than foreign exchange intervention).
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strain on the central bank of continually-observed higher liquidity becomes too
great. This suddenness is driven by an initial reluctance by forex dealers to
change their minds, despite the evidence of higher liquidity and lower interest
rates, mimicking Greenspan not ‘getting it’.11 After the belief change, the
solution under H1 is calculated using RE, giving (7) through (9).
We will now show that the above H0 is model consistent, in the sense that
if everyone believes H0, and m does in fact return to zero next period, their
beliefs will be vindicated. Things are simplified greatly by the fact that agents
do not believe the expansion is permanent under H0, so E[p∞] = 0. With no
reason to expect prices to change in the future, pt+1 = 0 and the full solution
follows immediately (note that from t + 1 onwards m = 0 under H0):
E[p∞] = 0 ⇒ pt = 0 from (4)
⇒ it = −m
Bi
from (3)
st = −(it + it+1 + it+2 · · · ) + s∞ from (5)










Agents observe prices, money and interest rates. Prices are uninformative,
and money is a sufficient statistic for the remaining two, so it is the signal.
Under H0, we assume a distribution of elapsed time before the expansion is
undone (and the exchange rate target is hit), with longer temporary expansions
being less likely. The number of periods that money is at m is therefore the
test statistic. After money has been equal to m for a ‘large’ number of periods
- with ‘large’ determined by the test size α - agents realize the truth and
jump from the belief that the expansion is temporary to the realization that
11Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) suggest that in a US context the uncertainty surrounding
the duration of a monetary shock may be due to inaccurate forecasts by the Fed, or, by
a temporary shift in the balance of power among the members of the Fed Open Market
Committee. Lewis (1989) takes a contrasting approach. In her model, departures from
UIP occur as agents learn gradually and ‘rationally’ (in the sense of using information
optimally, not in the sense of having zero-mean i.i.d. forecast errors) about money demand.
Commenting on this, Gourinchas and Tornell make two claims. First, Bayesian learning
would lead to a rapid convergence to the true model which conflicts with their econometric
evidence against interest-differentials learning. Second, Lewis’ model would not explain a
negative coefficient in the UIP regression.
10
The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, Vol. 9 [2009], Iss. 1 (Advances), Art. 42
http://www.bepress.com/bejm/vol9/iss1/art42
it is permanent. For example, if the sampling distribution of the elapsed time
before the central bank undoes a temporary money shock under H0 is e
−t then







From this p-value, it is clear that if the support of the density is 0 to ∞,
the probability density function integrates to unity. Finding the critical value
t∗ (the time elapsed before agents reject H0) is a matter of solving e−t
∗
= α,
or t∗ = − ln(α). For example, if α = .05, t∗ = 3. This sampling distribution is
for illustrative purposes only, and the remaining analysis does not rely on it.
The rejection region is: reject H0 if t ≥ t∗. As in all classical hypothesis
testing, the rejection region is decided upon prior to the collection of any data,
i.e. in period 0-. We have now defined all the elements of the IE solution. After
H0 is rejected, the model evolves according to the RE solution given by (7)-(9).
However, as was noted earlier, the powers of t are effectively set back to zero
since the solution must be identical to the RE solution at 0+. Equivalently, t
is replaced with t− t∗ in (7)-(9).
it+1 = (1−Bp)it









Importantly, IE has the capacity to deliver a sudden, and potentially large,
change in a model variable - here the exchange rate - for a small increment
of information, at the instant H0 is rejected. This can be illustrated with a
diagram.
The pattern in the right panel of Figure 3 is consistent with the so-called
delayed overshooting puzzle by Eichenbaum and Evans (1995). While incon-
sistent with RE and with the Bayesian model presented in the appendix for
reasonable parameter values, the delay in the exchange rate appreciation is
consistent with IE.12
12IE has the property that adjustments need not be gradual (depending upon the impli-
cations of H0 and H1), as in the diagram. So the comment in the text must be interpreted
in terms of a broad pattern. Being a VAR, the impulse response functions of Eichenbaum
and Evans had smooth depreciations and appreciations by construction.
11
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Figure 3: Dornbusch Setup with RE and IE
(Under H1 Left & Right Panels Identical)
Notes: The left-hand panel shows the standard dynamics from Dornbusch (1976) for a
monetary expansion. The right hand panel show the IE dynamics. Prior to H0 being
overturned, agents in the foreign exchange market ignore future (negative) interest rate
differentials, and the depreciated (lower) long run exchange rate. When H0 is discarded for
H1 the exchange rate jump depreciates s to the RE solution.
12
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2.4 Downward Bias in Uncovered Interest Parity and
RE Term Structure Regressions
We now show that data on S and R generated by this model with IE will,
when placed in the OLS regressions (1) and (2), create downward bias in the
parameters.
Theorem 1 If H0 is believed for at least one period, the OLS coefficient from
a regression of ∆St+1 on It − I∗(= it) will be less than unity.
Proof : Let t∗ be the time period in which H0 is rejected. The numerator
of the OLS coefficient can be decomposed into three terms; the cross product
summed prior to, at, and after t∗ − 1. It will prove useful to express all the


























We evaluate each quantity in the numerator separately. Taking the first term,
H0 exchange rates are fixed at m/Bi.








Parenthetically, this establishes Theorem 1 for the special case of α = 0.
Agents never switch from H0 and an OLS regression of ∆S on i will fit perfectly,
with a zero coefficient.
The middle term of the numerator in (13) involves a change in the exchange
rate from the H0 level at time t
∗ − 1 to the H1 path at time t∗ (see Figure 3.)
The H1 exchange rate at t
∗ is (9) with t− t∗ replacing t. It equals the 0+ RE
13
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solution, as prices don’t change from 0+ to t∗.



















































Since Bp is no larger than unity, 1−1/Bp is non-positive and hence 1−Bi−1/Bp
is strictly negative. The last term on the numerator of (13) is evaluated under







The OLS numerator is thus a weighted average of i2t , divided by the sum of i
2
t ,
with weights prior to the observations on the H1 path strictly less than unity













0 t < t∗ − 1
1−Bi − 1
Bp
< 0 t = t∗ − 1
1 t > t∗ − 1
(16)
Lemma 1 The OLS estimate could be negative.
Proof : A large enough |wt∗−1| could render the numerator sum negative.
Q.E.D.
Intuitively, agents are not factoring in the depreciation of the long run
exchange rate, which restrains the 0+ exchange rate (Figure 3). Under H0,
14
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Figure 4: Scatter Plot of ∆S and i
(1% M expansion, Bi = 0.5, Bp = 0.3, reversed axes)
agents (incorrectly) believe future it+j and st+j are zero. Unchanged pt implies
that it is fixed (Figure 3), so st is too, from (5). The data in a scatterplot
of ∆S vs. i (Figure 4 is based on a simulated model) will therefore have a
slope coefficient of 0 under H0 and unity under H1. When the exchange rate
jump between H0 and H1 occurs, the interest differential is negative but the
exchange rate depreciates in the next period. If the jump is large enough,
Lemma 1 says the OLS slope can be negative.
We now turn to (2), the term structure regression.
Theorem 2 If H0 is believed for at least one period, the OLS coefficient from
a regression of ∆It+1/2 on Rt− It will be biased downwards (strictly less than
unity).
Proof : First note that ∆It+1 = ∆it+1 and Rt − It = rt − it. As before, it
is convenient to express everything in terms of (r − i)2. Under H0:
it+1 − it = 0
∴ (it+1 − it)
2
(rt − it) = 0 · (rt − it)2.
15
Menzies and Zizzo: Inferential Expectations
Published by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2009
Note that the regression uses the actual change in the interest differential,
not the forecast one. The expected change from it to it+1 is not zero, because
H0 agents believe it+1 = 0. Each period, they are disappointed, which is a
corollary of being mistaken about the duration of the monetary expansion.
Under H1, equation (6) holds (with E[it+1] = it+1) and so:
(it+1 − it)
2
(rt − it) = 1 · (rt − it)2.









































0 · (rt − it)2 + 0 · (rt∗−1 − it∗−1)2 +
n−1∑
t=t∗






Clearly, a negative γ̂ is impossible, which is in keeping with the less over-
whelming rejection of the RE version of the term structure, compared with
UIP.
In concluding this section, we note that (16) and (17) highlight an implicit
link - first spelt out by Gourinchas and Tornell (2004) - between interest-rate
forecast errors and coefficient bias for the tests in (1) and (2).
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Recall the right panel of Figure 3. Under H0 agents mistakenly believe that
the interest differential will return to zero in the next period. However, once
H0 is discarded and the solution jumps to the RE path, there are no interest-
differential forecast errors (if it were not a perfect-foresight model the forecast
errors on the RE path would be i.i.d. errors). It therefore follows that a lower
α, implying a higher t∗, will worsen the forecasts for interest differentials.
The conjecture of Gourinchas and Tornell is that poor interest-differential
forecasting is responsible for the failure of UIP. In our model, it is obvious from
(16) and (17) that a higher t∗ will reduce the proportion of ones in the weighted
averages, leading to a predominance of zeros in (17) and/or 1 − Bi − (1/Bp)
in (16). Both these effects will unambiguously reduce OLS coefficients in ( 1)
and (2). Thus, IE provides an ‘expectations microfoundation’ for the failure of
both efficiency conditions, whilst exhibiting the secondary cause put forward
by Gourinchas and Tornell.
3 Discussion and Conclusions
In this paper we have proposed a new theory of expectation formation, which
we have labelled inferential expectations, which combines the model consis-
tency of RE with greater empirical plausibility. In the context of a Dornbusch-
style model of exchange rates, we proved that the regression tests of Uncov-
ered Interest Parity and the rational expectations version of the term structure
both display downward bias. By its nature, the model can also explain sharp
changes in the currency values, as one might expect in financial crises.
However, the idea of IE goes beyond the particular application we have
provided, and we wish to conclude by drawing links to existing literature. The
overlap of IE with other modelling approaches portends well for its future
applicability.
IE is close in spirit to Goldberg and Frydman (1996) and Frydman and
Goldberg (2003), who allow agents to conduct hypothesis tests over models.
Their program, in turn, can be traced back to an early discussion by Rappoport
(1985). IE is also related to Foster and Young (2003) game-theoretical work
on hypothesis testing by bounded-rational agents on their opponents’ repeated
games strategies.
IE is consistent with both empirical and theoretical work on infrequent
adjustment. On the former, near rationality has been shown to have small ex-
pected utility costs (e.g., Gruen and Menzies, 1995), and, on the latter, mod-
els of sticky expectations assume barriers to continual adjustment. However,
IE sits firmly in the class of state-dependent infrequent adjustment (as does
17
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Woodford, 2008), whereas much of the existing literature is time dependent.
There is also a potential connection between IE and reference-dependent
preferences, which have been explored in a number of papers to explain for
example labor supply and consumption decisions (e.g., Tversky and Kahne-
man, 1991; Sugden, 2003; Farber, 2008). Reference-dependent models need to
reconcile decisions which assume that the reference point is unchanged in the
short run with the plausible assumption that the reference point does change
through time, and just assuming that the reference point is the status quo is
clearly unsatisfactory. Tversky and Kahneman (1991) note that the reference
point may depend on expectations, and Közegi and Rabin (2006) make this
dependence endogenous by assuming RE. An alternative approach of making
reference-dependent models work is by assuming that the reference point re-
mains fixed while the null hypothesis holds, and shifts when the null hypothesis
is rejected (e.g., the agent ‘feels’ richer, therefore her reference point in terms
of wealth changes).
Finally, IE actually encompasses econometric learning (Evans and Honkapo-
hja, 2001; Orphanides and Williams, 2005). Learning, like IE, gains some le-
gitimacy from the practice of economists, and is a sub-case of IE. If we take
account of both the recursive least-squares estimates and their standard errors,
then regression-based IE with α = 1 becomes econometric learning.
A Appendix: A Bayesian Version of RE
A well-known result is that Bayesian updating can imply downward UIP bias
(see Lewis, 1989). We now verify this for our model, but show that delayed
overshooting does not occur for reasonable parameters. In period 0, agents
believe a permanent or temporary expansion is equi-probable. As time passes,
they update the probability the expansion is permanent (θ) using a discrete






t ≥ 0 (18)
The time-evolving posterior θt that the expansion is permanent is given by
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Expected money is a convex combination of its permanently-higher value and
its zero value:
m̂t = θt ·m + (1− θt) · 0 = θtm t ≥ 0 (20)
Forward looking agents use m̂t as the certainty-equivalent value of m from
t+1. So, their expectations are based on the RE solution with m̂t replacing m
in section 2.2. As time advances, m̂t evolves with θt, and agents update their
expectations. As in the RE and IE solutions, the p0 is zero. From p1 onwards,
prices are determined by (21):
from (4) pt+1 = pt −Bp(pt − m̂t) t ≥ 0 (21)





t ≥ 0 (22)





j ≥ 1 (23)
The solution for the exchange rate relies on the expected path of interest
rates and money. As in the RE solution, (21) and (23) together imply it+1+j =
(1−Bp)jit+1:
st = −(it + it+1 + it+2 · · · ) + s∞
= −it − (it+1 + (1−Bp)it+1 + (1−Bp)2it+1 + · · · ) + m̂t
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The period t exchange rate therefore requires an expression for it+1:





(1−Bp) · (pt − m̂t)
Bi










For the simulated solution, p0 = 0 and the expected monetary shock for
the future is calculated using (19) and (20) with t = 0. Then (21) gives the
price level for the next period. Equation (22) gives the current interest rate,
again for t = 0, and (25) the current exchange rate. In period 1 the probability
the shock is permanent is updated using (19), and so on.
When this model is simulated for reasonable values, it turns out that a bias
of around 0.5 robustly occurs in both the UIP and term structure regressions.13
However, unlike with the IE model, negative coefficients on the UIP regression
cannot be found, and delayed overshooting (Eichenbaum and Evans, 1995)
does not occur. Naturally, given the gradual nature of Bayesian updating,
sharp changes in the currency values - as observed in Figure 1 - are also ruled
out in the model, while they are predicted by IE.
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